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WARMING UP THE COOL PLACE: 
KIERKEGAARD, WITTGENSTEIN AND D.Z. PHILLIPS 
Anthony Rudd 
This paper is a critical examination of D.Z.Phillips' supposedly 
Wittgensteinean "contemplative" conception of philosophy, as he applies it to 
religious issues, and in particular to his discussions of Kierkegaard. I argue that 
this conception embodies an commitment to an ideal of neutrality which rests 
on an unacceptable account of philosophy as aiming for a "view from 
nowhere"; that Phillips fails to appreciate the full significance of Kierkegaard's 
way of doing philosophical work; and that Kierkegaard has a valuable account 
to offer of how philosophy can have a normative significance, even after the 
demise of the foundationalist ambition to stand outside all language games. 
There has been a good deal of discussion recently of the relation 
between Kierkegaard and Wittgenstein. D.Z. Phillips has argued that they 
are both anti-metaphysical thinkers, who reject the foundationalist project 
of finding a validating basis for our practices which is external to those 
practices. Both of them, according to Phillips, have an alternative concep-
tion of philosophy as conceptual clarification, an unravelling of confusions 
which are generated by failing to distinguish one practice/language-
game/ form of life with another. However, Phillips also advocates - and in 
this he claims, rightly or wrongly, to be following Wittgenstein - a further 
conception of the role of philosophy, one that he calls "contemplative", and 
which he does not think is present in Kierkegaard. In this paper, I want to 
argue that this conception of philosophy (whether or not it is really 
Wittgenstein's) is not tenable; that Phillips fails to appreciate the full signif-
icance of Kierkegaard's way of doing philosophical work; and that 
Kierkegaard has a valuable account to offer of how philosophy can have a 
normative significance, even after the demise of the foundationalist ambi-
tion to stand outside all language games. 
I 
Phillips begins his book, Philosophy's Cool Place' by telling a story which, 
in one form or another, is by now a familiar one. Once upon a time, it was 
thought that philosophy - metaphysics - was able to provide us with a 
direct inSight into the nature of Reality as it is in itself. On the basis of this 
insight, philosophy could then critically appraise all the other forms of dis-
course and practice that we engage in - all the varieties of science, religion, 
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morality, politics and so forth - and decide which were legitimate by seeing 
which ones really addressed or reflected the nature of Reality itself. But 
now we have (or many of us have) lost confidence in this picture. 
Philosophy has no direct inSight into the Real which enables it to playa 
critical and foundational role for the rest of human culture. This raises the 
question: what, if anything, can the role of philosophy be after the demise 
of foundationalism? Phillips' answer is, firstly, that philosophy has the task 
of unravelling conceptual confusions which arise when the "grammar" of 
one language-game is misconstrued by analogy with that of another. But 
beyond this, he urges philosophy to adopt a "contemplative" stance, one 
that is rooted in a fundamental wonder that there is such a thing as dis-
course at all, that the language-games we play should even be possible. 
This is supposed to avoid the errors of traditional foundationalism, 
while also avoiding the neo-pragmatism or ironism recommended by 
Rorty. For Rorty, once we have rejected the pretensions of traditional meta-
physics, we are simply left with the particular language games, and no 
absolute perspective from which they could be either validated or criti-
cised. But Rorty takes it that conceptions such as "truth" or "reality" are 
themselves metaphysical ones; the demise of fowldationalism doesn't just 
mean that we should abandon the attempt to get an absolute perspective 
on the language-games, but that we should abandon the idea that the lan-
guage games themselves aim to get at the truth, that they aim to disclose 
reality to us. (Unless these formulae themselves are reinterpreted in a very 
blandly pragmatic sense.) So science, morality, religion etc are just ways of 
coping; they don't aim at truth in any more exalted sense than that. Phillips 
rejects this conception', pointing out quite rightly that Rorty himself 
remains a kind of foundationalist; rather than accepting our language-
games for what they are, he reinterprets them in the light of his general 
philosophical outlook (neo-pragmatism), and by so doing drains them of 
any claims that they make to embody truth or goodness. In this way he 
makes them compatible with a blandly tolerant attitude, but in so doing 
fails to respect their specificity. Rorty's stance is not really neutral; he 
imposes his own anti-realist outlook on the practices he describes. 
Phillips, by contrast, purportedly following Wittgenstein (this is not the 
place to enquire into whether or not he has Wittgenstein right) recognises 
that there are practices, language-games or what have you, that do make 
strong claims about what is true or good or right, and that the making of 
these claims is essential to the practices themselves. However, he does not 
think that it is any business of philosophy to adjudicate between conflict-
ing beliefs. From its "cool place" it contemplates the various language-
games without making normative judgments about them, though it still 
recognises their right to make such judgments about one another. This 
does not, Phillips argues, mean that philosophers "cannot be critical of any 
religious practice"; there are occasions on which "philosophical reflection 
reveals confusion in religious practices."2 If practices themselves are con-
fused, then a perspicuous description of them will reveal that confusion. 
But one can only demonstrate such confusion by reference to other (uncon-
fused) practices, which means that we cannot coherently suppose all our 
practices to be confused.3 Philosophy cannot pass judgement on practices 
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from a standpoint external to them. It notes the differences, it umavels the 
concephlal confusions that arise when one language-game is construed in 
terms appropriate to another, and beyond that it engages in the (slightly 
mysterious) practice of wondering at the possibility of there being dis-
course at all. (This concern for conditions of possibility might suggest a 
Kantian transcendental inquiry into the necessary preconditions of lan-
guage-games, but it is clear that Phillips has nothing like this in mind.) 
In what follows, 1 want to contrast this conception of philosophy's role 
with Kierkegaard's philosophical practice. I will argue, firstly, that, in criti-
cising certain important claims that are made by Kierkegaard, Phillips 
abandons his own "official" conception of philosophy and becomes open 
to a form of the same objection that he himself brought against Rorty. 
Secondly, 1 will argue that Kierkegaard shows us how, without reverting 
to foundationalism, philosophy can playa critical, as opposed to a merely 
contemplative role, that it can be used to assess, rather than simply to 
describe certain language-games. 
II 
Phillips' demand for philosophical neutrality is apparently intended to 
let the various language-games be themselves. But it still continues, if in a 
rather enfeebled and shadowy form, the foundationalist tradition. Phillips 
demands that the philosopher, qua philosopher, abstain from any judge-
ments as to the rightness or wrongness of particular language-games, but 
he does not deny that the philosopher qua participant in some particular 
language-game has the right to make judgements about the goodness of 
one practice compared to another. So a Catholic may, qua Catholic, 
denounce Satanism as evil. But if the Catholic is also a philosopher, then 
speaking philosophically s/he can only note that Catholics say and do 
these things, Satanists say and do those ones, that they do not appreciate 
one another ... and then engage in contemplative wonder at the existence of 
these varied forms of discourse. This amounts to asking the person who 
has strong commitments of any kind to become a split personality when 
s/he becomes a philosopher: 
The assumption underlying this ideal of neutrality is that 1 can rise above 
my commitments - even those which are most fundamental to me as a per-
son, those which go to constitute my sense of identity. As a philosopher, I 
can stand above the conflicts which engage my passions as a participant, 
and simply contemplate them. The old metaphYSical ambition to step out-
side our own skins, to enjoy the view from nowhere, is thus continued in 
Phillips' work. It is an enfeebled version of the traditional ambition, 
because, for Phillips, although the philosopher can stand outside all of the 
particular language-games, that perspective makes available no standards 
by which to criticise or evaluate anything s I he sees from that vantage point. 
There is a point of view external to our particular practices which we can 
adopt, but it is not a normative one. It seems, nonetheless, that this claim 
would still be exposed to many of the criticisms that have been brought 
against the "view from nowhere" conception. In particular, Kierkegaard 
would have seen it as dangerously "demoralising" to suppose that we 
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could set our deepest, identity-conferring commitments to one side while 
engaging in philosophical contemplation.s However, although Phillips' 
"official" position is a neutral one, he himself seems unable to resist givin.g 
philosophy a more critical role. Not only is he committed to something like 
a "view from nowhere", it also turns out that he claims the right, from that 
perspective, to criticise and revise our particular language-games. 
In a discussion of Kierkegaard's Purity of Heart, Phillips objects to 
Kierkegaard's claim that those who do not will the Good are necessarily 
double-minded. Kierkegaard says that even those who are apparently 
committed whole-heatedly to evil or selfish aims still harbour an ineradica-
ble longing for the Good, and thus remain internally divided. Phillips com-
ments that "This seems to be sheer stipulation on Kierkegaard's part"6 and 
he goes on to point out that there are people who seem to have no longing 
for the Good at all, who are entirely happy in their depraved ways. 
Phillips' overall thesis is that, although Kierkegaard gives many persuasive 
examples and diagnoses of inner division in Purity of Heart, he is mistaken 
to claim that it is a universal condition for those who do not sincerely will 
the Good; this claim is an illicit generalisation which fails to be sensitive to 
the existence of counter-examples. 
I think this criticism misses the point of what Kierkegaard is doing. He 
does not make his claims on the basis of empirical investigations. He does 
not present evidence to show that he has investigated a large sample of 
depraved characters, and found none who escape a longing for the Good. 
Nor does he claim that the depraved would always admit, even to them-
selves, that it is the Good they are longing for. When he asserts that "[j]ust 
as a person, despite all his defiance, does not have the power to tear him-
self away completely from the good ... he also does not even have the power 
to will it completely"7, this is, in an important sense, an a priori claim. It is 
fundamental to Kierkegaard's religious convictions (and surely to main-
stream Christianity in general) that we are created with an inclination to 
the Good, and that in turning against the Good we are turning against our 
own natures. In Purity of Heart, Kierkegaard is writing, not as an empirical 
psychologist, but as a religiously committed individual, presenting an 
"upbuilding discourse" for the edification of other such individuals. The 
assumption that there is in us, however much we may want to deny it, a 
longing for the Good is a basic assumption which goes to constitute the 
kind of language-game that Kierkegaard is playing here. By denying - on 
essentially empiricist grounds - that Kierkegaard is entitled to such an 
assumption, Phillips is doing precisely what he is supposed not to be doing 
by his own lights - dismissing a language-game that is in fact played, 
because it does not conform to his philosophical presuppositions. 
Can Phillips be defended against this criticism? By his own standards, 
he is entitled to criticise a religious practice or belief only if the description 
of it shows it to be confused by reference to other practices. Jamie Ferreira, 
building on Phillips' work, has developed a clearer account of how this 
might work - of how a descriptive philosophy can have a normative force -
than I can find in Phillips' own writings. She points out that for 
Wittgenstein "[dlescription is not simply empirical generalisation" but an 
attempt to give a perspicuous account of "the norms generated in prac-
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tice."S So description isn't just a random cataloguing of facts; rather 
"Wittgenstein sees himself to be describing the common structure inform-
ing religious aspirations."9 If a descriptive philosophy could make clear the 
nature of the basic norms characterising a religious form of life, then it 
could also make clear the confusions of a purported believer whose words 
or actions contradicted "a norm to which all religious believers hold."10 In 
this way philosophy could have a critical, normative role without having 
to impose its own standards on practices from the outside. 
Ferreira's account has its problems. The claim that there is a "common 
structure" of norms that all religious believers would hold to might seem 
to involve a dubious essentialism. In fact Ferreira insists that "[t]his com-
mon structure is not a matter of essence, but rather a grasp of a family 
resemblance commonality ... "11 But it seems highly unlikely that the sort of 
"a posteriori" investigation that Ferreira has in mind could come up with a 
set of norms "to which all religious believers hold". A "family resem-
blance" account will typically be one that finds lots of criss-crossing simi-
larities and differences, but no essential features that all family members 
share.12 One might reply that we needn't be so ambitious - we might per-
haps succeed in finding norms that a smaller but still substantial group 
share - perhaps all Catholics. And so a Catholic who could be shown to be, 
without recognising the fact, departing from those norms, would be 
revealed as confused. The real issue, then, turns out to be self-contradic-
tion. It would not by itself have any normative significance to point out 
that someone's beliefs differed from those of some other (or even most 
other) believers - unless the first person had a commitment to accepting 
what the others believedY Philosophy's critical function, then, is to point 
out contradictions between the norms believers implicitly accept and either 
the things they explicitly say, or the beliefs that are implicit in other things 
that they do. However, such contradictions, once realised, could be 
resolved in either of two ways - by rejecting the norms or by rejecting the 
beliefs that conflict with them. Philosophy is only concerned with the fact 
that there is a contradiction - it has, on Ferreira's account, nothing to say 
about how to resolve it. So only a very minimal normativity is involved-
no more than one can get out of the law of non-contradiction. 
Can Ferreira's account be used to defend Phillips' critique of 
Kierkegaard?" To do so, one would have to show that Kierkegaard's state-
ments about our longing for the Good stood in contradiction to the implicit 
norms of the (religious? Christian? Protestant? Pietist?) form of life which 
he himself accepted. But, of course, Phillips shows no such thing. His 
objection to Kierkegaard's claims is not that they conflict with the "deep 
grammar" of religious existence, but that they conflict with a collection of 
empirical data about the conscious psychological states of depraved peo-
ple. (And as it is part of Kierkegaard's claim that such people suffer from 
self-deception, it is begging the question to think that he can be refuted by 
simply citing their testimony.) As for the norms that are central to the kind 
of Christianity to which Kierkegaard adhered, and which it would embar-
rass him to come into conflict with; as I suggested above, his claims seem 
to be very much in harmony with them. Kierkegaard is in fact attempting 
to spell out explicitly what is implicit in a way of life that seeks to treat all 
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people - even the most depraved - as children of God, capable, however 
corrupted by sin, of mrning back to Him. So Kierkegaard is doing what 
Ferreira thinks a philosopher should - making explicit the norms implicit 
in a form of life. But Kierkegaard is doing so from within that form, and 
having done so, he is using those norms to give an account of aspects of 
human life outside the religious sphere. And this account is not an "empir-
ical generalisation", but a perspicuous representation of modes of human 
activity and self-deception - perspicuous, of course, from the standpoint of 
the religious form of life in which he shares. 
Phillips certainly appears to be criticising and rejecting, on philosophical 
grounds, a crucial thesis that Kierkegaard is asserting on first-order reli-
gious grounds. For Phillips, philosophical descriptions can have a critical 
force if they make perspicuous confusions that acmally exist in the reli-
gious discourse. But we haven't yet seen any good reasons to think that 
Kierkegaard is confused in this way. And the only other way in which 
Phillips' criticism could be justified on his own terms would be if he could 
show that the thesis he is criticising was not in fact a first-order religious 
one (confused or otherwise), but a philosophical doctrine which 
Kierkegaard was superimposing on his religious discourse. If Kierkegaard 
was illicitly moving from legitimate religious exhortation into confused 
philosophy, then he would be opening himself to proper philosophical crit-
icism. But in order to make out this case,15 Phillips would have to make the 
- highly implausible - claim that one can neatly sort out what is "philoso-
phy" and what is "religion" in a work like Purity of Heart. 1 hAnd it would, of 
course, be philosophy that would be doing the sorting out. So the philoso-
pher, once again, would stand in judgment over the particular language-
games, insisting on the right to tell them what they may legitimately say or 
not say, and rejecting those elements of them that s/he finds philosophical-
ly disreputable. Kierkegaard's claim about the double-mindedness of those 
who fail to fully will the Good is a basic part of his religious outlook; for 
the philosophical overseers to reject it on the ground that it is really an illic-
it piece of philosophising would radically alter the namre of the language-
games that religious people would be allowed by them to play. 
III 
In this section I want to consider another attempt by a would-be 
Wittgensteinean philosopher to show that claims like those that Phillips 
objects to in Purity of Heart are indeed confused; and to show this without 
abandoning a stance of philosophical neutrality. Michael Weston, follow-
ing James Conant and Stephen Mulhall, has argued for an interpretation of 
Kiekegaard's Postscript which sees it as a parody, one that sets up philo-
sophical arguments which are in contradiction to the "grammatical" 
reminders that he thinks are contained in the earlier part of the workY 
Those reminders have to do with the essentially first-personal namre of 
thinking about the meaning of life. Weston thinks that Johannes Climacus, 
the pseudonymous author of the Postscript, having presented these 
reminders, is then set up by Kierkegaard to develop an argument that we 
can only find meaning in our lives "through a relation to the eternal"18 and 
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that means that we must move from the aesthetic, to the ethical, to the reli-
gious and finally to the Christian way of life in order to fully establish such 
a relation. Weston then objects, in very much Phillips' manner: 
How can we say that [an aesthete] 'really' desired a meaning for her 
life as a whole which is contradicted by what, when she reflects on 
her life, she is content with? .. [W]hat Climacus is proposing is that 
we know a priori that any such life is self-deceived. lhat is to objectify 
the notion of the meaning of life. It is to forget ... that there is no gen-
eral question of the meaning of life to which there could be a general 
answer.l9 
Unlike Phillips, Weston does not take himself to be criticising 
Kierkegaard here; he assumes that this is precisely the point that 
Kierkegaard is intending us to see by showing us Climacus' blundering. 
(But the fact that Climacus' assumptions here are clearly identical with 
those expressed by Kierkegaard under his own name in Purity of Heart 
seems by itself to be a fairly decisive argument - not that others are lacking 
- for rejecting this interpretation.) So on Weston's view, there is a contra-
diction between Climacus' insistence that questions about the meaning of 
life have to be investigated from a first-personal perspective, and his equal-
ly passionate insistence that there is something universal about the answer 
to such questions; that for everyone it applies, that we can only ultimately 
find meaning by relating to "the eternal." So Climacus - and any believers 
who suppose that they have a universally valid answer to the question of 
the meaning of life - have mistaken the grammar of their own language-
game, are contravening (other) norms that they implicitly accept. 
Weston's claim that there is a contradiction here seems to me to be 
reveal a serious misunderstanding of Climacus' (and Kierkegaard's) insis-
tence on the first personal character of existential thinking. Climacus (and 
Kierkegaard) certainly insist that I have to discover for myself that my life 
can only become meaningful through a relation to Cod; but for 
Kierkegaard (as well as for Climacus) it is axiomatic that there is a univer-
sal human nature, that we were all created on the same terms.2U But if so, 
then it is true for anyone that his or her life can only become ultimately 
meaningful through a relation to Cod - though what this will mean for 
each individual's life remains a matter for that individual to discover. 
Augustine exclaimed to Cod that "you have made us for yourself and our 
heart is restless until it rests in yoU."2l As the Confessions amply demon-
strates, it took deeply first-personal experience to bring Augustine to that 
conclusion, but the conclusion is about the relation of humanity in general 
to Cod.22 In finding a contradiction here, Weston is confusing an epistemo-
logical claim that a universal truth can only be apprehended through one's 
subjectivity, with a metaphysical (or "grammatical") claim that there is no 
universal truth in existential matters. 
But in any case, even if there was a contradiction here, why should it be 
resolved, as Weston demands, by rejecting the belief in universal validity 
rather than the insistence on the first-personal stance? Is it because the lat-
ter is more deeply embedded in religious practice? I think it would be very 
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hard to show, just from a neutral, descriptive survey of practices, that that 
actually is the case. Or is it because some mysterious insight into "gram-
mar" reveals that one belief is connected to the Platonic essence of "the 
notion of the meaning of life" while the other is not? Weston would scarce-
ly want to say that. But he does make, from what is supposed to be a neu-
tral philosophical position, highly controversial claims about what that 
notion involves. (That there can't be a general question of the meaning of 
life is a claim supposedly derived from insight into the notion of the mean-
ing of life, which itself looks suspiciously general.) Such claims cannot 
plausibly be derived from a purely descriptive survey of practices. 
However he does it, Weston is apparently insisting on the right to decide, 
ex cathedra, what is properly religious and what isn't. Once again, we see an 
apparently humble conception of philosophy turning out to conceal a 
remarkably ambitious, not to say imperialistic vision of the role of philoso-
phy vis a vis the rest of culture. 
IV 
So it is not only Phillips who falls into confusions about neutrality while 
trying to interpret Kierkegaard. But it is also not only in criticising 
Kierkegaard that Phillips contravenes his own proclaimed neutrality. 
Elsewhere too he claims the right to reject, on philosophical grounds, views 
that are central to religious forms of life. The most striking example is his 
treatment of the concepts of immortality and eternal life. He argues, on 
philosophical grounds, that we cannot take these beliefs literally. To sup-
pose that I will continue to exist as a self-conscious subject after my physi-
cal demise - whether as a disembodied soul or as a resurrected body - is, 
according to Phillips, philosophically incoherent.23 But, as a simple matter 
of empirical fact, such beliefs do playa large part in most if not all religious 
traditions. Once again, Phillips is claiming the right, on the basis of a sup-
posed superior philosophical knowledge, to dismiss beliefs that are central 
to the religious lives of many people. There is no Wittgensteinean modesty 
here, no refusal to advance positive philosophical doctrines; Phillips seems 
quite clear that philosophy is able to prove that people are psycho-physical 
unities, and not potentially immortal souls temporarily inhabiting bodies. 
But that rejected belief is not just a bit of remote philosophical theorizing; it 
is central to various religious traditions and to the deepest hopes and fears 
of their adherents. 
It is significant, though, that Phillips considers the belief in personal 
immortality is not just philosophically confused, but also irreligious, in that 
it represents a selfish concern for personal survival, rather than a properly 
religious concern for the transcendence of such selfishness. And he doesn't 
simply reject all talk of eternal life. In Death and Immortality he interprets it 
as referring to an attitude which we may adopt to our lives here and now, 
one in which we see them under "the aspect of eternity."24 In more recent 
work his position seems less straightforward, and indeed he explicitly criti-
cises some "attitudinal" accounts.2' But he continues to repudiate any idea 
of a "temporal immortality" and to insist that the only genuinely religious 
outlook is one which has abandoned any concern for personal survival. 
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Now Phillips does not try to claim, as a descriptive psychologist or sociolo-
gist, that religious believers do in fact just mean what he thinks they ought 
to mean when they talk of eternal life; such a claim would be quite obvi-
ously false as an empirical observation.26 What he is saying, rather, is that 
the beliefs of some religious people are not really religious at all, but rather 
superstitious - where superstitions are self-serving fantasies which may be 
demonstrably false on philosophical, or perhaps on scientific grounds.27 
And other people may be genuinely religious, but still fall into confusions 
when they try to articulate the understanding that they are nonetheless 
able to manifest in their lives.28 
Now Phillips is quite entitled to argue, as a participant in a religious 
form of life, for an interpretation of traditional language about immortality 
along non-realist, attitudinal lines.29 This would be a controversial claim 
made within a religious context. But he also apparently wants to claim, as a 
philosopher and not just as a believer, that this interpretation is the only 
genuinely religious one; and this claim is presented as a "neutral" philo-
sophical insight into the "grammar" of religious belief. But here again we 
see Phillips, as the philosopher surveying forms of life from the height of his 
cool place, claiming the right to decide what is "really" religious, and what 
is merely superstitious. By contrast, Miguel de Unamuno places the longing 
for a thoroughly "literal" immortality at the heart of what religion is: "The 
longing for the immortality of the soul, for the permanence in some form or 
another of our personal and individual consciousness, is as much of the 
essence of religion as the longing that there might be a God. The one does 
not exist apart from the other, the reason being that fundamentally they are 
one and the same thing."30 Who is right? The answer, surely, is that the 
question can only be asked within a religious context, where it becomes the 
question, "What should I believe?" (Unamuno is well aware of this; his is an 
explicitly existential philosophiSing, which makes no claim to neutrality.) 
But to ask outside any such context, from a neutral "cool place", whether 
the belief in personal immortality is really religious or superstitious, is a 
futile exercise. Where, asks Unamuno, "does religion end and superstition 
begin, or perhaps rather shall we say, at what point does superstition merge 
into religion? What is the criterion by which we discriminate between 
them?"" There is no philosophical answer to this question, because there is 
no "essence" (definable by "grammar" or otherwise) of "religion" (or even 
e.g. of Christianity) which is accessible to a neutral investigation. To 
describe a belief or practice as "superstitious" is to repudiate it, to take a 
stand against it, and it is therefore at least implicitly to affirm one's own 
commitments. It is not a piece of neutral conceptual elucidation. 
Phillips however, has attempted to meet Unamuno's challenge by pro-
viding neutrally applicable criteria for distinguishing between religion and 
superstition. Superstitions, he claims, are "blunders, mistakes, regarding 
causal connections of a kind."32 Later he amended this claim: superstitions 
are not just blunders but confusions, where a confusion is a (causal) belief 
that couldn't possibly have been true. He gives the example of someone 
who tries to injure an enemy by sticking pins in a picture of the person. It 
isn't that this might have worked but in fact doesn't - rather "[w]e have 
not the slightest idea of what it could mean to say that sticking pins in the 
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picture could harm someone else."33 He later adds that "the superstitious 
character of a practice will show itself in the character of the expectations 
which surround it and in the tension between these and our common 
understanding of causality."34 So a boxer who crosses himself before a 
match is superstitious if he thinks it will protect him from injury; he may 
be religious if he does so as a way of dedicating his performance to God.3s 
It seems then that for Phillips a belief is superstitious if it expects God or 
supernatural agencies to bring about any physical changes in the world; 
religious if it is concerned with the attitude we adopt to the world. This 
understanding is characteristic of a certain kind of modern religious 
thought, which responds to the rise of science by abandoning belief in the 
miraculous, leaving science to explain why anything happens, and inter-
preting religion as having to do purely with an inward transformation of 
our attitude towards the world.36 That this understanding of religion should 
be widespread in modernity is not surprising, but Phillips is taking a view 
characteristic of one kind of (modern, liberal) religion and making it the 
defining (universal, ahistorical) essence of religion (as distinguished from 
superstition) in general. A purely descriptive account, by contrast, would 
note that the distinction between "religion" and "superstition" has been 
made in many different ways in different religious traditions and that these 
distinctions do not simply coincide with one another, or with the one that 
Phillips makes between the physical-causal and the spiritual-attitudinal. 
Of course one could make Phillips' distinction, and one could as a matter 
of stipulation say that the elements distinguished are to be called "religion" 
and "superstition". But would this distinction, if made philosophically, 
from "the cool place" and so without endorsing the correctness of any par-
ticular religious beliefs, have any normative force? Phillips thinks that a 
neutral description can show superstitious beliefs to be confused. If we con-
tinue to follow Ferreira's account of how this works, the confusion would 
be some sort of contradiction between such beliefs and others that the 
superstitious person is also committed to. These could be religious beliefs 
(in Phillips' high-minded quasi-Stoic sense, where they are sharply distin-
guished from any attempt to gain personal benefits) and/ or scientific or 
common sense beliefs about causality. But we need to ask whether there 
really are contradictions here. A "superstitious" belief in causal factors 
beyond those recognised by science needn't contradict anything that science 
does recognise, though it would contradict a scientistic philosophical claim 
that science can explain everything. And while there may be a tension 
between high-minded "religious" concerns for transcending selfish desires, 
and "superstitious" desires for practical benefits, it isn't clear that there is 
any formal contradiction between them. Why shouldn't the boxer cross 
himself for both protection and dedication? And, furthermore, even if there 
were contradictions, we again need to ask how philosophy (on Phillips' 
view of it) can tell us how to resolve such contradictions. If my superstitious 
beliefs do contradict my religious or my scientific beliefs, why shouldn't I 
resolve the contradiction by rejecting the latter rather than the former? A 
purely descriptive philosophy cannot assert the correctness of the norms 
implicit in any practice/form of life; but this means that it cannot have any 
normative force that goes beyond the mere demand for logical consistency. 
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This is not to say that we should not distinguish between religion and 
superstition, or even that we should not do so along the lines Phillips sug-
gests; but we should recognise that such a distinction is not a neutral one. 
Wittgenstein says "Religious faith and superstition are quite different. One 
of them results from fear and is a sort of false science. The other is a trust-
ing."" But I see no reason why we should have to take that as a philosophi-
cal remark in Phillips' sense of "philosophical". It is an expression (signifi-
cantly, written as a private note, not as part of a philosophical work) of 
Wittgenstein's own normative commitments. 
So Phillips' discussions of immortality seem to go against his pro-
claimed neutrality in two ways. Firstly, by arguing that the non-realist 
interpretation of immortality is the only one that the established results of 
enquiry in the philosophy of mind leave open to religious believers, 
Phillips takes philosophy to be advancing definite theses, which then con-
strain the possibilities open to other forms of discourse.38 And secondly, he 
argues, as a philosopher and not simply as a believer, that his interpreta-
tion of concepts such as "eternal life" is the only genuinely religious one. 
By doing so, he makes it look as though the constraints imposed by a 
sound philosophy of mind don't in fact take anything away from what is 
genuinely religious. But these (allegedly neutral, philosophical) claims 
about what is really religious could only make sense if the philosopher 
had, in some quasi-Platonic way, an access to essences which enabled him 
or her to make authoritative judgments about what is and is not, truly reli-
gious. And such an access could not be provided by the purely descriptive 
philosophy that Phillips endorses. 
v 
It seems then that would-be Wittgensteinean philosophers find it hard 
to maintain their own "official" attitude of neutrality, departing from it by 
making judgments about particular language games from a position which 
is purportedly external to them all. Kierkegaard, I want to suggest, has an 
altogether clearer sense of what philosophy can and cannot do. He allows 
that philosophiSing can be critical, that it can have a normative edge; but 
he denies that it can exercise that normative function from an external 
standpoint. 
Kierkegaard is concerned with different "spheres of existence" or 
"stages of life" - aesthetic, ethical and religious (as well as various interme-
diate stages and sub-divisions.)39 But how can we decide what is the best 
way to live? Kierkegaard rejects the metaphysical project which would aim 
to validate or invalidate these ways of life by seeing whether they were 
based on an accurate apprehension of Reality as it shows itself to the neu-
tral, purely objective gaze of the philosopher (e.g. by seeing whether one 
could prove the existence of "objective" moral standards, or of God). So he 
attacks the confusions of "pure thought" - the attempt to stand outside any 
particular sphere of existence, in order to judge them all from some neutral 
ground.4o And he is also, as Phillips notes, concerned to clear up conceptual 
confusions which arise from failing to distinguish clearly between the 
spheres. (e.g. confusing a religious acceptance of the authority of an apostle 
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with aesthetic admiration for the achievements of a genius.") However, 
Kierkegaard does attempt to do something more than this philosophically; 
he tries to show us how we can make normative judgments as to the rela-
tive value of the different spheres of existence. How, though, can he do this 
if there is no neutral perspective from which the various ways of life can be 
compared with Reality in itself? 
The lack of such an external perspective means that such norma-
tive judgments must be made from within one or other sphere. Hence 
Kierkegaard's judgments about the different stages of life are made from 
within the religious, and ultimately the Christian sphere. This might seem 
to raise problems of incommensurability. A Christian may condemn aes-
theticism from Christian premises, but this will cut no ice with the aesthete. 
This is why Kierkegaard resorts to indirect communication. That one can-
not adopt a universal standpoint, does not mean that one is hermetically 
sealed into a single outlook; hence Kierkegaard's creation of pseudony-
mous authors to express and explore from within the various stages of life. 
In doing this, Kierkegaard is trying to clarify what it means to live aestheti-
cally or ethically, or religiously and to note the differences between these 
ways of life. By a good description one can, for instance, make clear to 
muddled aesthetes that they are not really Christians. Phillips thinks that 
this is philosophically legitimate; but for him philosophy cannot go beyond 
this to show aesthetes that they ought not to be aesthetes. One practice may 
criticise another, but philosophy can only note that there are these conflicts; 
it cannot say that any substantive view is better than another. (Though 
Phillips would accept that it is religiously legitimate for the Christian to 
condemn aestheticism, or to preach to the aesthete.) 
But Kierkegaard isn't just (qua philosopher) noticing differences, nor is 
he just (qua religious author) preaching to the aesthete in terms that are 
incommensurable with the aesthete's own. He is philosophising on the 
basis of his own ethico-religious convictions, but in a way that is meant to 
address those who do not share those convictions. The point is to show the 
aesthete that aestheticism is unsatisfactory, and to show that from the 
inside. How, though, can this be possible, if the different stages of life dis-
agree precisely about what constitutes a good reason?42 Kierkegaard's reply 
is that rational argument between the different spheres is possible, not 
because there is any neutral point of view from which they can all be com-
pared, but because all the stages (except perhaps lower forms of aestheti-
cism) have a common concern - they are all parts of a wider existential lan-
guage game. That is, they all share a concern with how a human being 
should live. This shared concern enables one to develop a critique of one 
stage from another, by showing that it does not enable the self to live a full 
and satisfactory life, even though that common concern does not exist as 
another sphere distinct from all the particular ones. 
Kierkegaard believes, as I have noted above, that there is a common 
human nature which demands a certain way of life from us; we are all 
aware of it, but are inclined to repress that knowledge. It is this belief that 
is the basic presupposition of his account of the stages of life. Those living 
at the aesthetic, at the merely ethical, or indeed the merely religious (reli-
giousness A) level are involved in repressing that self-knowledge; there-
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fore they suffer from the frustration and internal division that he diagnoses 
in Purity of Heart. The diagnosis can only be made plausible to those who 
do not start by sharing Kierkegaard's assumptions, by providing phenom-
enologies of the different ways of life which aim to show them as involving 
existential aporias and crises which cannot be resolved in their own terms. 
These problems can be experienced within the "lower" spheres, but they 
can only be understood in terms derived from the "higher" ones. Hence 
the rationality of the move, for instance, from the aesthetic to the ethical; 
the latter offers the possibility of articulating the sense of dissatisfaction 
which can be experienced while attempting to live a purely aesthetic life, 
but which cannot adequately be understood in terms of the categories 
which the aesthetic has available (boredom, bad luck etc.)43 
But there is an obvious objection to this account - for the account of the 
self on which Kierkegaard relies is a part of his wider ethico-religious view 
of the world. The different spheres may all share a common concern for the 
well-being of the Self, but they give very different accounts of it. So how 
can Kierkegaard presuppose his view of the Self while addressing those 
who do not share it? The simple answer is, because he thinks it's true. 
Kierkegaard argues from within existence. And that means that he does 
not aspire to Phillips' impossible neutrality. For him the appropriate place 
to consider ethical and religious conflicts is from the position within those 
conflicts that one thinks is the true one. The criterion he relies on for mak-
ing judgments of relative worth between existential stances is the nature of 
the Self. But his account of that criterion is itself not a neutral one - an aes-
thete, a non-religious ethicist and a non-Christian religious believer will 
give different accounts of the nature of the Self. But this does not mean that 
there can be no rational debate between the different spheres. It does mean 
that the debate will take the form of a hermeneutic exercise, rather than a 
foundationalist attempt to show that the superiority of one way of life can 
be demonstrated from a point that is external to all of them. Instead, the 
participant in sphere X will try to show those who live in other spheres 
that it is in terms of a sphere X understanding of human life that they can 
make most sense of their own lives; in particular someone in sphere Y 
would have to be shown that sphere X has the resources to adequately 
understand the problems of which s fhe may be more or less consciously 
aware in sphere Y, and offer a plausible alternative. Further, one might 
attempt to show that those who adhere to a sphere Y understanding do so 
precisely in order to hide from themselves the (perhaps challenging or dis-
turbing) truths that are understood in sphere X. This hermeneutics of sus-
picion is of course central to Marx's, Freud's and Nietzsche's criticisms of 
religious and (some) ethical beliefs. But it is also a crucial part of 
Kierkegaard's critique of non-religious outlooks. 44 
Kierkegaard's pseudonymous works are attempts to develop this 
hermeneutical argument; he is successful to the extent that e.g. an aesthete 
can recognise him or herself in Kierkegaard's fictional exemplars of the aes-
thetic life and, in so doing, be brought to recognise the shortCOmings of that 
way of life. Alternatively, an aesthete may be motivated to respond by set-
ting out a rival vision of the aesthetic,45 and perhaps to present fictional or 
pseudonymous ethico-religious characters, with the aim of bringing ethical 
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and religious believers to see themselves in a different light. The question 
being disputed here is whether the conflicts and differences between the 
aesthetic, the ethical and the religious are themselves best understood in 
aesthetic, ethical or religious terms. This debate certainly cannot be settled 
by appealing to a neutral point situated beyond it, but it does not follow 
from that that it cannot be a rational debate (unless one takes a very narrow 
Enlightenment/ foundationalist view of what reason is). Nor does it follow 
that such a debate would have to be considered a non-philosophical one 
(unless one stipulates a similarly narrow definition of what philosophy is). 
And finally, contra Phillips, I can also see no reason to suppose that philoso-
phy could find a way to adequately describe and thus contemplate, such a 
conflict in terms which were neutral as between the conflicting parties.46 
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